Abstract-String matching is a basic problem of string operation, and privacy-preserving string matching, as a special case of secure multi-party computation, has broad applications in auction, bidding and some other commercial areas. In this paper, some protocols are proposed to solve this private matching problem, the security and correctness are analyzed respectively, and the actual efficiency is tested by experiment. A protocol is also designed based on the BMH algorithm which is more efficient and conceals more private information.
INTRODUCTION
With the development of the Internet, information sharing becomes more and more important. There are lots of cooperative computations, where people cooperate to conduct a computation on their private inputs. Usually, people want to jointly conduct a computation while protecting each participant's private information, this is well known as Secure Multi-party Computation(SMC). This problem was first introduced by Yao in 1982 [1] , and there have been many theoretic researches since that [2~6 ]. But it is impractical to solve all the SMC problems by the general methods, special solutions should be developed for special cases for the efficiency [2] . There are lots of special protocols for SMC [7~18 ]. String matching is a basic problem of string operation, it has many applications in information retrieval, data compression, gene sequence matching, electronic commerce, net security and so on. String matching means to determine whether there is a string which can absolutely match with the pattern P in the text T. There have been many researches about this problem and some famous algorithms have been proposed, such as the KMP algorithm, BM and BMH algorithm. In this paper, we introduce the security to the conventional string matching and discuss this problem on the condition of the privacy-preserving. We state the problem as follows:
Privacy-preserving String Matching(PPSM): Alice has a private string A which length is n, while Bob has a private string B which length is m, they jointly determine whether B matches A, but Alice does not want to tell Bob his private A, and Bob also does not tell Alice any information of his private string. This paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces some related work. In section III, a simple protocol to determine whether two strings are equal is proposed based on the modular exponentiations, and we also give the probability of the wrong result that the protocol may return by experiment. In section IV, we propose two protocols for PPSM, and analyze the correctness, privacy and complexity. Finally, in section V, we conclude this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Definitions
In this section, we introduce some necessary definitions.
1) Secure model
In secure two-party computation, if all the inputs are in the set of real number(R), suppose that I A and I B are Alice's and Bob's secret inputs, O A and O B are their outputs respectively. Let C represents the computation between Alice and Bob. A protocol which can conduct C is safe if it satisfies the following two conditions [7] :
2) One-way Function There are two sets X and Y, a function f is a one-way function if, it is easy to compute f(x) for each x∈X, but for almost all y in the range of Y, it is computationally hard to compute x which satisfies y=f(x).
3) Homomorphic Encryption Schemes
A general definition of the Homomorphic Encryption Schemes is depicted as follow [19] : An Encryption is a homomorphic encryption if E(m 1 
B. Basic Algorithms and Protocols 1) Elgamal encryption scheme
The Elgamal encryption scheme is a multiplication homomorphic scheme, and it conducts the encryption as TABLE I [19] : In the Elgamal scheme, one encryption takes 2logp modular multiplications, and one decryption takes logp modular multiplications.
2) Private Comparison Protocol
Alice has a secret number a while Bob has a secret number b, they want to compare these two numbers to decide which is larger with no information revealed other than the result. This problem was first proposed by Yao [1] and was well known as Yao's millionaires' problem. There are lots of solutions to this problem now, in paper [18] , an efficient data comparing protocol(DCP) was proposed based on cross products protocol.
3) Private Information Retrieval(PIR)
The PIR problem consists of two parties, the user and the database, each has a secrete input. The database holds an nbits string B=b 0 b 1 …b n−1 , and the user wants to get b i from the database while hiding i, and the database does not want the user to know his string. This problem was first proposed by Chor, Goldreith, Kushilevtz and Sudan [20] in 1995, and has received lots of attention [21] [22] [23] ].
III. PRIVACY-PRESERVING STRING EQUALIZATION PROTOCOL(PPSE)
This section introduces two solutions to determine whether two strings are equal. First, we propose a simple protocol and this protocol may give wrong decision sometimes, we analyze the probability of it by experiments, then, an accurate protocol is given.
1) A PPSE Protocol based on modular exponentiations
In this solution, we propose a simple protocol to PPSE based on modular exponentiations. According to the definition of one-way function, it is clear that the modular exponentiation which has fixed exponent and modulus is a one-way function. It is easy to compute c=a e modp according to a, e and p, but if we know e, p and c, it is computationally to compute a which satisfies c=a e mod p. This is well known as discrete logarithm assumption. Protocol 1 is based on this assumption, it is easy, but sometimes may return a wrong result.
The round complexity of protocol 1 is 1, and it needs 2n modular multiplications. According to the protocol we can conclude: a) When A=B, the protocol can give the correct decision all the time; b) When A≠B, the protocol may make a mistake because there may be some different a i and b i which make a i e modP=b i e mod P, in this situation, the protocol will return TRUE, determine that A=B, but actually, A≠B. We test the error probability of protocol 1 by the experiment as follow:
STEP 1: Random generate two strings A and B, both the lengths are 10, let the unequal number are m=1,2,3,4,5, we simulate protocol 1 for 10000 times, and get the error probability as TABLE III(N denotes the unequal num, E denotes the error probability).
STEP 2: Let the unequal number are m=1,2,3, select different primes to repeat STEP 1, TABLE IV depicts the error probability changed with the unequal number and the prime we select(P denotes the prime, E denotes the error probability).
According to the experiments, the more the unequal number exist, the lower will be the error probability. And the error probability also has business with the prime, if we choose a prime which is large enough, the error probability will be small. (Security) Alice conceals his private input a i in the table T, and according to the security of the Elgamal encryption, Bob is not able to get the information of a ij , so he can not calculate a i , in the process of comparing b ij and a ij , Bob computes c i and then sends this result to Alice, Alice is not able to know b i if a ij ≠b ij .
(1) finally, according to the property of multiplication homomorphic, we have E(m 1 ) ⊗ E(m 2 )=E(m 1 ×m 2 ), so E(1) ⊗ E(1)=E(1) and E(1) ⊗ E(r j )=E(r j
(Complexity) The round complexity of Protocol 2 is 3, and it needs (2k+1)logp+k−1 modular multiplications.
Alice sends the table T and the last result to Bob, Bob communicates with Alice when they exchange c i , so the round complexity is 3. In STEP 1, to reduce the computation, Alice generates T[~a ij ][j] by choosing a random pair (α, β) as an Elgamal encryption of r j , so Alice only needs k encryptions, and Bob conducts k−1 multiplications to compute c i , and conducts Elgamal encryption of one times to compute E(1). In STEP 3, Alice decrypts c i , for the Elgamal encryption, each encryption takes 2 logp modular multiplications, each decryption takes logp modular multiplications, so protocol 2 needs (k+1)×2 logp +(k−1)+logp=(2k+3)logp+k−1 modular multiplications.
To determine whether A=a 0 a 1 …a n−1 is equal to the string B=b 0 b 1 …b n−1 , we just need to check whether a i =b i for all i=0,…n−1 by using PPNEP, but if Bob sends c i to Alice every round, they will know which i that makes A≠B, so Bob should conduct some operations to c i , and then send the final result to Alice for security reason. The protocol to determine whether two strings are equal is depicted as TABLE VI. The analyses of the correctness and security of Protocol 3 is the same as Protocol 2. The round complexity is n+1, and the computation complexity is:
n(2klogp +k-1)+n-1+logp =(2kn+1)logp+nk-1.
IV. PRIVACY-PRESERVING STRING MATCHING PROTOCOL(PPSM)
In this section, we will propose two protocols to solve the private-preserving string matching problem. A simple protocol is proposed based on our protocols in section , and we will also introduce a more efficient protocol which is combined with BMH algorithm.
1) A Simple Protocol for PPSM
In this problem, Alice has a private string A=a 0 a 1 …a n−1 , while Bob has a private string B=b 0 b 1 …b m−1 , where n>>m, to determine whether B matches A, we just need to find if there exists a substring S i =a i a i+1 …a i+m-1 of A which makes S i =B. We propose a protocol as Alice and Bob firstly cooperate to find the character which is equal to b 1 in the string A, they invoke protocol 3 to detect whether the sub string S i =a i a i+1 …a i+m-1 of A is equal to B. In the worst case, they should invoke PPNEP and PPSEP2 n times respectively, and they both can know that which item that they are matching. This protocol needs (2kn 2 +2kn+kn)logp + n 2 k+nk-n-k modular multiplications.
2) A PPSM Protocol Based on BMH Algorithm
There are many classical approaches to solve string matching problems, such as Brute-Force (BF) algorithm, Knuth-Morris-Pratt(KMP) algorithm [24] , Boyer-Moore(BM) algorithm, Boyer-Moore-Horspool(BMH) algorithm and so on. In this section, we will introduce the BMH algorithm concisely and then propose a protocol to the PPSM based on it. BM algorithm, which is known to be very effective in practice, is proposed by Boyer and Moore in 1977, then Horspool R.N. improved this algorithm and formed the BMH.
The BM algorithm is made of two steps, pretreatment and searching. First, two tables are initialized by preprocessing the pattern, deata 1 and deata 2 , deata 1 has as many entries as there are characters in the alphabet, and deata 2 has as many entries as there are characters positions in the pattern, then the text is moved according to the offset. During the search operation, the characters of pattern are matched starting with the last character of the pattern, namely the matching is from right to left; If there is a i where P i ≠T i , which results in a failure of the matching, then the offset is computed by the two tables, and then move the pointer of the text according to the offset until the matching is succeed [25] . Lots of improved algorithms are proposed by many others based on the BM, in this paper, we proposed a protocol based on one of the improved algorithms while protecting the private information. Instead of using two tables in BM, we only initialize one table to decide the move distance, the description of the matching is:
a) The 
V. CONCLUSION
String matching is a special problem of SMC, it has wide applications in electronic transactions, auctions, commercial enterprises and other commercial fields. In this paper, we proposed two protocols to determine whether two strings are equal secretly, one is a simple protocol which may produce a wrong decision sometimes, and we test the error probability of it by experiments, while the other is an accurate algorithm. Then we used the above protocols to solve the private matching problem, and at last, we introduced the BMH algorithm to our protocol to improve the efficiency.
